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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KATHE C HOMER, 
Plaintiff-Appellee 
vs 
STEPHEN G HOMER, 
Defendant-Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Court of Appeals 
Case No. 20000008-CA 
DESIGNATION OF THE PARTIES 
The Plaintiff-Appellee is Kathe C Homer, a natural 
person. The Defendant-Appellant is Stephen G Homer, a 
natural person. The parties are former spouses to each 
other, having been divorced in 1989. 
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is granted pursuant to 
the provision of Section 78-2a-3 (2) (h), Utah Code 
[appeals from district court involving domestic 
relations]. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
This "appeal" is NOT the garden-variety "divorce 
case". This "appeal" presents issues of "constitutional 
dimension" involving "denial of equal protection of the 
law" and the "uniform operation of the law", in 
contradiction to the state and national constitutions. 
This appeal presents the following issues for 
review: 
1. Whether the constitutional principles of 
"equal protection of the law" and "uniform 
operation of laws" are violated by the 
interpretation and application of specific 
provisions of 30-3-5(h), Utah Code [providing 
that "lifetime" alimony may not be awarded in 
"short term" marriages] and the general 
provisions of Section 30-3-5, Utah Code 
[providing for award of alimony in general] if 
applied only in divorce cases filed after the 
effective date of such new legislation. 
2. Whether the trial court properly 
A 
interpreted and applied the relevant 
constitutional provisions in dismissing the 
petition to modify the decree of divorce. 
The interpretation and application of provisions 
of the state and national constitutions as well as Utah 
statute by the trial court are matters of law. The 
trial court's conclusions of law in civil cases are 
reviewed for correctness. United Park City Mines 
Company vs Greater Park City Company, 870 P.2d 880, 885 
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Society of Separationists, 
Inc. vs Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993) . 
This standard of review has also been referred to 
as a "correction of error standard". Jacobsen 
Investment Company vs State Tax Commission, 83 9 P. 2d 
789, 790 (Utah Supreme Court 1992); Sanders vs Ovard, 
838 P.2d 1134, 1135 (Utah Supreme Court 1992). 
"Correction of error" means that no particular 
deference is given to the trial court's ruling on 
questions of law. State vs Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 
(Utah Supreme Court 19 94); Provo River Water Users' 
Association vs Morgan, 857 P. 2d 927, 931 (Utah Supreme 
Court 1993) . The "correction of error" standard means 
that the appellate court decides the matter for itself 
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's 
5 
determination of law. State vs Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 
(Utah Supreme Court 1993); Howell vs Howell, 806 P.2d 
1209, 1211 (Utah Court of Appeals 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Petition for Modification alleges and presents 
the following material facts, implicitly admitted by 
the Respondent (wife) in the Motion to Dismiss: 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married 
in August 1980. 
2. In September 1987 the Plaintiff filed 
this action for divorce, seeking an absolute 
divorce upon grounds of "irreconcilable 
differences", and obtained a restraining order 
requiring the Defendant-Petitioner to leave 
permanently the marital residence. 
3. In October 1989 the Court entered a 
Decree of Divorce, granting to the Plaintiff 
the absolute divorce requested and ordered the 
Defendant to pay to the Plaintiff $150.00 per 
month in alimony. 
4. Beginning in August 1989 and continuously 
each month thereafter the Defendant has paid 
$150.00 per month alimony to the Plaintiff. 
5. The 1995 Utah Legislature passed into law 
House Bill No. 36, enacting new provisions 
codified at Subsection 30-3-5 (6) (h) , Utah 
Code, to provide: 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for 
a duration longer than the number of 
years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that 
justify the payment of alimony for a 
longer period of time. 
1995 Laws of Utah, Chapter 330. 
6. There were and are no extenuating 
circumstances which justify the continuing and 
future payment of alimony. 
[See Petition to Modify, attached hereto as EXHIBIT 1.] 
The wife's "motion to dismiss" granted by the 
district court admits the truth of the allegations of 
the Petition. When considering a dismissal based on 
Rule 12, the court must accept the material allegations 
of the complaint as true, Petersen vs Jones, 16 Utah 2d 
121, 122, 396 P.2d 748, 748 (Utah 1964). Colman vs 
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622 (Utah 1990). 
In 1995 the Legislature adopted House Bill 36, 
entitled "Revision of Alimony Standards", making 
significant changes in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code. The 
portion of the 1995 legislation characterized herein 
as "the new statute" applicable to this appeal is 
contained in subsections (g) [prohibiting modifications 
of alimony awards except in cases of "extenuating 
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circumstances"] and (h) [expressly denying to the trial 
court any power to order lifetime alimony] . When these 
two provisions are coupled with the alimony provisions 
found generally in Section 30-3-5, Utah Code, the 
legislative creation of a "classification" is evident. 
On 29 October 1999 the District Court heard oral 
arguments concerning the Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss; 
no sworn evidence was received. On 29 November 1999 the 
District Court entered an order [EXHIBIT #3, hereto] 
dismissing the Petition to Modify. This appeal was 
thereafter perfected. 
ARGUMENT 
THE NEW STATUTE VIOLATES CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES 
OF EQUAL PROTECTION, UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS, AND 
THE OPEN COURTS PROVISIONS 
A 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment: 
[Section 1] . . . nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Emphasis added. 
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
"All laws of a general nature shall have 
uniform operation." 
Q 
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution 
provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, 
property or reputation, shall have remedy by 
due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no 
person shall be barred from prosecuting or 
defending before any tribunal in this State, 
by himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party. 
B 
THE NEW DIVORCE STATUTE 
This case and this appeal is not focused upon 
whether or not the new statute [i.e. Section 3 0-3-5(h), 
Utah Code] is "procedural" or "substantive" or whether 
it should be applied "retroactively" or only 
"prospectively" . The case is about whether or not 
Section 30-3-5(h) and its companion statutory 
provisions sets up an unconstitutional classification. 
When coupled with the new provisions codified at 
30-3-5(g), Utah Code simultaneously adopted as part 
of House Bill 36 the overall statute has the effect 
of creating two "classifications" under the law: those 
divorced under the "old" (i.e. pre-1995 statute) and 
those persons divorced under the "new" (i.e. 1995 
statutory amendments) statute. 
That the divorce statute sets up such a 
classification is clear from a close reading of House 
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Bill 36. As is facially obvious, subsection (h) 
precludes the court from awarding "lifetime" alimony, 
except in "extraordinary circumstances". [If the 
statute is applied "prospectively" only, then paying 
spouses under "old" divorces are obligated to pay 
"lifetime" alimony, whereas similarly-situated persons 
under the "new" (i.e. post-1995) divorce law are not so 
obligated.] 
Under the provisions of subsection (g) , the 
analysis AND EFFECT is almost flip-flopped. Those 
alimony-receiving persons (i.e. former wives, 
generally) under "old" divorces are statutorily 
precluded, except in cases of "extraordinary 
circumstances" from seeking and obtaining a 
modification of the decree increasing or extending 
alimony; it is as if the Legislature has envisioned and 
is attempting to curtain the "intellectual 
gamesmanship" reflected in the Wilde vs Wilde decision, 
969 P.2d 438 (Utah Court of Appeals 1998). 
This situation can best be illustrated with a 
hypothetical example perhaps almost silly in the 
extreme but it illustrates the principle. 
Assume, for example, that two "twin" males 
separately marry "twin" sisters, on the same 
date. The two couples have the exact same 
marriages: same earnings, same number of 
children, same incomes, same everything as 
ridiculously "same" as we can legally assume 
things to have been in our contrived 
hypothetical. Seven years later, the twin 
sisters decide to file for divorce from their 
husbands. They go to the Clerk's Office of the 
District Court, where they wait in line. Their 
actions are taken at the end of the business 
day on the last day before the effective date 
of the new statute (circa 1 May 1995) . The one 
"twin" is allowed to file, while the other 
twin is told to come back in the morning. She 
does so, and files AFTER the "new" statute 
(i.e. no permanent alimony) is in effect. The 
two cases proceed on the litigation track. 
They are assigned to the same judge. Because 
the two marriages are so absolutely "equal", 
the actual trial of the two divorce cases is 
consolidated. The later-filed case the 
divorce filed AFTER the effective date of the 
new statute is granted first. In that 
situation, the husband of that divorce is 
obligated to pay alimony for a period not 
longer than the marriage lasted (i.e. 7 
years) . However, his legal "twin" (in the 
hypothetical) is, because of the filing under 
the "old" statute, exposed to the possibility 
of "lifetime" alimony, merely because his 
former spouse was standing in line in the 
Clerks's office in front of the other spouse. 
One might say that the "hypothetical" example is 
extreme; perhaps so, but it illustrates the point. 
The Court of Appeals decision in Wilde vs Wilde, 
969 P.2d 438 (Utah Court of Appeals 1998), is directly 
to that effect. [Why is "alimony" so jurisprudentially 
unique that a judgment regarding alimony is so fraught 
with intellectual dishonesty? What other kind of 
financial obligation, reduced to judgment, would be 
judicially increased per Wilde merely because the 
judgment of the court was not promptly paid? Why do 
courts engage in such substantively-insignificant 
ii 
sophistries to award (or extend) alimony, and yet 
ignore the substantive legal effect of the underlying 
legislation obviously intended to terminate an award of 
"lifetime" alimony? Indeed, Wilde, when carefully 
understood, is authority for the trial court to 
properly terminate a previous award of alimony, under 
the "new" statute, whether that statute is 
characterized as "retroactive" or not!] 
The only distinguishing feature between the two 
divorces is whether one is approached for subsection 
(h) purposes under the "old" statute or under the 
"new" statute. Yet the effect upon the parties is 
tremendous. 
It is difficult to envision a more "real life" 
example which doesn't carry with it all of the 
intellectual and jurisprudential "baggage" which 
alimony carries with it which illustrates this point. 
An example might be the following: if the Legislature 
passed a statute which gave all "new" drivers their 
driver's license at not charge, whereas those who had 
already been granted driver's licenses had to continue 
to pay, even upon renewal. Surely such an invidiously 
discriminatory statutory scheme would not be allowed to 
stand. 
If, as the wife now argues, the "new" statute is 
procedural and should be applied only to "new" 
divorces, the husband in the later filed divorce will 
only have to pay alimony for ONLY seven years, whereas 
the other husband may have to pay alimony for a 
lifetime, merely because his former spouse filed under 
the "old" statute. 
C 
CONSTITUTIONAL APPLICATION 
The foregoing constitutional provisions have, 
independently and/or in conjunction with one another, 
been utilized to invalidate a number of statutes. See, 
for example, Berry vs Beech Aircraft Corporation, 717 
P.2d 670 (Utah Supreme Court 1986) [limitations 
provisions of Utah Product Liability Act]; Sun Valley 
Water Beds of Utah, Incorporated vs Herm Hughes & Son, 
782 P.d 188 (Utah Supreme Court 1989) [architect's and 
builder's statute of repose]; Horton vs Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P. 2d 1087 (Utah Supreme Court 1989) 
[former architect's and builder's statute of repose]. 
Malan vs Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 1984) 
[automobile guest statute unconstitutional]; Johnston 
vs Stoker, 685 P.2d 539 (Utah Supreme Court 1984) 
[aircraft guest statute unconstitutional] ; State Tax 
Commission vs Department of Finance, Utah, 576 P. 2d 
1297 (Utah Supreme Court 1978) [statute 
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unconstitutional because it singled out the state 
insurance fund from all insurance companies that were 
found to be within the same class to pay a special 
tax]; Dodge Town Inc. vs Romney, 480 P.2d 461 (Utah 
Supreme Court 1971) [Sunday closing law that required 
only licensed automobile dealers to close and permitted 
other businesses to transact business on Sunday 
unconstitutional because the discrimination failed to 
further the legislative purpose of preventing fraud and 
auto thefts] ; Broadbent vs Gibson, 105 Utah 53, 69, 140 
P.2d 939, 946 (1943) [general Sunday closing law 
unconstitutional because the statute had so many 
exceptions to the general rule that the statute 
actually constituted "a grant of a special privilege to 
the excepted classes" without a legal excuse for not 
granting the same privilege to others] ; Skaggs Drug 
Centers, Inc. vs Ashley, 26 Utah 2d 38, 484 P.2d 723 
(1971) [large number of exceptions to the statute in 
question casts substantial doubt on what the 
Legislature actually intended]. 
Malan vs Lewis, supra, held that Article I, Section 
24 requires that a law must apply equally to all 
persons within a class and that statutory 
classifications must have a "reasonable tendency to 
further the objectives of the statute." 6 93 P.2d at 
670. In this regard, the objectives of the statute are 
ambiguous, at best. On the one hand, the Legislature 
has clearly stated in subsection (h) that "lifetime 
alimony" is, in most cases (except in cases where 
"extenuating circumstances" are found) , not to be 
awarded. That applies to the "new" divorces. But 
subsection (g) prohibits, except in "extenuating 
circumstances" cases going exactly the opposite way, 
the reopening of any divorce cases for the purposes of 
modifying alimony. 
The Legislature cannot create two classifications 
of persons and deny to the one class the rights (i.e. 
to not have to pay "lifetime" alimony), merely based 
upon the filing date of the divorce! 
What are the "reasonable objectives of the statute" 
when the statute prohibits (in most cases) the award of 
lifetime alimony, while simultaneously mandating that 
those similarly-situated persons from "old" divorces 
are obligated to pay a permanent alimony? It cannot be 
said (or assumed) that the Legislature was concerned 
about the minimal burden upon the courts; the courts 
have always had "continuing jurisdiction" to entertain 
modification orders. See, also, Reed vs Reed, 404 U.S. 
71 (1971) [Idaho statute preferring males over equally-
qualified females for appointment as administrators of 
1 C 
intestate estates violates Equal Protection Clause of 
14th Amendment]. 
The new statute represents a significant change in 
the legal environment in which alimony is to be 
approached. This change in "the law of alimony" IS 
BINDING upon the Court and upon the parties hereto. 
The trial court's "jurisdiction" (i.e. the power 
to order alimony in divorce cases) arises from statute, 
not from the inherent power of the court. Thus, the 
Court must follow those pronouncements of the 
Legislature, as embodied in the statute. 
To do otherwise (i.e. to apply the statute only in 
cases of "new" divorces while ignoring the statute and 
its provision in "old" divorces, although recently 
brought before the Court in "petitions for 
modification" such as this one) invokes the very 
"constitutional" issues identified in Paragraph 8 of 
the Petition: that the effect of the so-called "no 
retroactivity" argument (as anticipated by the 
Petitioner) creates two "classes" of persons under the 
law: (1) those persons who must pay alimony because 
there divorce was granted BEFORE the 1995 effective 
date of the statute and (2) those persons who obtain a 
divorce AFTER the 1995 effective date of the statute. 
In Liedtke vs Schettler, 649 P.2d 80 (Utah 1982), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that Article I, §24 is 
"generally considered the equivalent of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment, U.S. 
Constitution." 649 P.2d at 81 n.l. Although their 
language is dissimilar, Article I, §24 and the Equal 
Protection Clause embody the same general principle: 
persons similarly situated should be treated similarly, 
and persons in different circumstances should not be 
treated as if their circumstances were the same. See 
Baker vs Matheson, 607 P.2d 233 (Utah 1979) ; McLaughlin 
vs Florida, 379 US 184 (1964) . 
The question thus is posed: does the "divorce law" 
(i.e. Section 30-3-5, Utah Code), under which 
"lifetime" alimony is (or has been) awarded PERMANENTLY 
in pre-1995 divorces (the "old" divorces) have "uniform 
operation" when men which is almost universally the 
case, which raises its own set of "unconstitutional" 
discrimination issues who are parties to post-1995 
divorces (the "new" divorces) do not have to pay 
permanent (i.e. non-terminating) alimony, by reason of 
the application of the 1995 amendment to the statute? 
If the "no retroactive application" interpretation of 
the statute advanced by the Respondent is followed, the 
statute facially DOES NOT have "uniform operation" nor 
does it provide for the "equal protection" as is 
-i n 
constitutionally required. 
In Malan vs Lewis, 693 P. 2d 661 (Utah Supreme Court 
1984), the Utah Supreme Court invalidating the Utah 
"automobile guest statute" illuminated and 
articulated the purposes and application of the 
"uniform operation of laws" and the "equal protection" 
provisions of the constitutions. The Court wrote: 
Whether a statute meets equal protection 
standards depends in the first instance upon 
the objectives of the statute and whether the 
classifications established provide a 
reasonable basis for promoting those 
objectives. 
Article 1, §24 protects against two types 
of discrimination. First, a law must apply 
equally to all persons within a class. 
Second, the statutory classifications and the 
different treatment given the classes must be 
based on differences that have a reasonable 
tendency to further the objectives of the 
statute. If the relationship of the 
classification to the statutory objectives is 
unreasonable or fanciful, the discrimination 
is unreasonable. Equal protection of the law, 
;•;.•>.'•.; both state and federal, "requires more of a 
state law than nondiscriminatory application 
within the class it establishes . " The 
classification must rest upon some difference 
which "'bears a reasonable and just relation 
to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed, and can never be 
made arbitrarily and without any such basis . 
[A]rbitrary selection can never be 
justified by calling it classification." "The 
Courts must reach and determine the question 
whether the classifications drawn in a statute 
are reasonable in light of its purpose. The 
law under Article I, §24 is not different. 
693 P.2d at 670-72. Emphasis added. Citations to cases 
1 O 
and footnotes omitted. 
The claimed "legislative classification" i.e. 
that former spouses under the "old" divorces must 
continue to pay lifetime (non-terminating) alimony 
while former spouses obtaining "new" divorces are 
entitled to terminating alimony, if any arising from 
the "no retroactive application" interpretation 
advanced by the Respondent and followed by the District 
Court: 
1. DOES NOT ". . .provide a reasonable basis 
for promoting those objectives; 
2. IS NOT " . . . based on differences that 
have a reasonable tendency to further the 
objectives of the statute . . ."; AND 
3. DOES NOT "[bear] a reasonable and just 
relation to the act in respect to which the 
classification is proposed. . ." 
See Malan vs Lewis, supra. The clear legislative intent 
is to PROHIBIT awards of "lifetime" alimony! 
Although alimony has, over time, been seemingly 
explained and seemingly justified on a number of bases 
over the centuries, those "historic" arguments for the 
continuation of lifetime alimony are now made "moot" by 
the legislative action embodied in Section 30-5-6(h), 
Utah Code. The statute reflects the present policy of 
1 Q 
the state: that lifetime alimony is not to be awarded 
or required, except in "extenuating circumstances" 
(which Respondent herein has admitted DO NOT EXIST). 
With the state's "policy" (regarding the prohibition of 
"lifetime alimony") now clearly before us. 
Given the fact that the Legislature has now, as a 
matter of public policy, mandated that "(permanent) 
alimony may not be awarded") , all of the "historic" and 
legalistic arguments for continuing the practice of 
economic bondage by which a former spouse is 
financially bound to another must fail. It is clear 
that the Legislature has said: "NO MORE permanent 
(lifetime) alimony!" 
To continue to advance an interpretation of the 
statute so as to circumvent the clear legislative 
intent behind Section 30-5-6(h) is unconscionable and 
contrary to the Court's obligation to "obey the 
Constitution" and "uphold the law", particularly when 
the effective result of the Court's interpretation is 
to create the very unconstitutional "classification" 
complained of. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated: 
For a law to be constitutional under Article 
I, section 24, it is not enough that it be 
uniform on its face. What is critical is that 
the operation of the law be uniform. A law 
does not operate uniformly if "persons 
similarly situated are not "treated similarly" 
or if "persons in different circumstances" are 
"treated as if their circumstances were the 
same." 
Malan vs Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 at 669 (Utah 1984). 
Emphasis added. That some former spouses must pay 
"lifetime" alimony while some do not adjudicated 
merely upon the filing date of the divorce action is 
not the "uniform operation" the constitution requires! 
In State Tax Commission vs Department of Finance, 
the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Equal protection protects against 
discrimination within a class. The legislature 
has considerable discretion in the designation 
of classifications but the court must 
determine whether such classifications operate 
equally on all persons similarly situated. 
Thus, whether a classification operates 
uniformly on all persons situated within 
constitutional parameters is an issue that 
must ultimately be decided by the judiciary. 
576 P.2d 1297 at 1298 (Utah 1978). Emphasis added. 
Similarly, the legislative denial of rights to 
those persons paying "lifetime" alimony under the "old" 
statute similarly offends the "open courts" provision 
[Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution). 
CONCLUSION 
The "classification" (and its resultant 
discrimination) cannot be condoned, especially in light 
of the legislative pronouncement that "lifetime" 
alimony is no longer to be awarded. 
There is no legal or factual justification for 
o-i 
imposing upon one class of persons (those divorced 
under the pre-1995 ("old") statute) the obligation of 
"lifetime" alimony and the economic peonage it entails 
while simultaneously excusing those similarly-situated 
persons divorced under the post-1995 ("new") statute 
from paying "lifetime" alimony, solely because of the 
court's refusal to find "retroactive" application to 
that statute! 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of May, 2000. 
Attorney Pro Se 
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT to be hand-delivered to the office 
of Ms Helen E Christian, Attorney at Law, Gustin, 
Christian, Skordas & Caston, Boston Building, Suite 
#810, #9 Exchange Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, 
this 31st day of May, 2000. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C HOMER, 
Plaintiff-Respondent 
vs 
STEPHEN G HOMER, 
Defendant-Petitioner 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
OF 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 87-2098 
Case assigned to Judge Harding 
The Defendant-Petitioner STEPHEN G HOMER hereby petitions the 
Court for a modification of the Decree of Divorce, entered October 
1989, in the above-entitled action. 
This Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is based 
upon the following grounds*. 
1. The Plaintiff and Defendant were married in August 
1980. 
2. In September 1987 the Plaintiff filed this action 
for divorce, seeking an absolute divorce upon grounds of 
"irreconcilable differences", and obtained a restraining 
order requiring the Defendant-Petitioner to leave m 
permanently the marital residence. 
3. In October 1989 the Court entered a Decree of 
EXHIBIT 1 
Divorce, granting to the Plaintiff the absolute divorce 
requested and ordered the Defendant to pay to the 
Plaintiff $150.00 per month in alimony. 
4. Beginning in August 1989 and continuously each month 
thereafter the Defendant has paid $150.00 per month 
alimony to the Plaintiff. 
5. Subsection 30-3-5 (6) (h) , Utah Code, provides: 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration 
longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of 
time. 
6. There were and are no extenuating circumstances 
which justify the continuing and future payment of 
alimony. 
7. The Defendant-Petitioner is entitled to an Order 
modifying the Decree of Divorce, permanently and 
irrevocably terminating the requirement that alimony be 
paid. 
8. Continued requirement of alimony, in any amount, in 
this case deprives the Defendant-Petitioner of the 
constitutional rights guaranteed him under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and under the uniform 
operation of laws clause of Article I, Section 24 of the 
Utah Constitution. 
2 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
WHEREFORE, Defendant: - Pet i l ioner prays for: the following relief 
1. That the Court enter an Order, modifying the Decree 
of Divorce previously-entered and permanently and 
irrevocably terminal ing the requ i teiuent that alimony be 
paid to the Plaintiff; 
2. That Lhe Court award judgment in favor of the 
Defendant tuL iliuiici lor his at I. e> J no y ' s LeeS and costs 
incurred in bringing and prosecuting this Petition; and 
3. That the Court award such other relief as is just. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of July, 1999. 
%j^^^ 
De tt/hdant - Petitioner Pro Se 
Plaint iff' s address: 
KATHE C HOMER 
1015 East 50 0 North 
Orem, Utah 84 0 97 
Defendant' s address: 
STEPHEN G HOMER 
92 2 5 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, Utah 84 088 
STEPHkN G i iGMLH 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN ,j 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
a 
-oooOooo-
KATHE C. HOMER, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 87-2098 
Judge Ray Harding, Jr. 
-oooOooo 
Petitioner, KATHE C. HOMER, by and through her counsel, Helen E. Christian, moves 
the Court to dismiss the Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed by Respondent on 
the following reasons and grounds set forth in the Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce filed contemporaneously with this Motion. 
DATED this _C_ day of August, 1999. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
EXHIBIT 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this _\o_ day of August, 1999, I caused to be mailed, 
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO DISMISS to: 
Stephen G. Homer 
9225 South Redwood Road 
Wesi Jordan, UT 84088 
Kristine Wimmer Berg 
homei.mol 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KATHE C. HOMER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEPHEN G. HOMER, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
Case No. 87-2098 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
I 
This matter comes before the Court on Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree 
of Divorce. The Court has reviewed the file, the memoranda filed by the parties, heard oral 
arguments, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby issues the following: 
RULING 
The parties to this action were married in August, 1980. Their Decree of Divorce was 
entered October 26, 1989. It provides that "[t]he Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum 
of $150.00 per month as alimony payable in two equal monthly payments on the 5th and 20th of 
each month commencing July, 1989." The Defendant has paid $150.00 in alimony each 
month since August 1989. 
At the time the parties' Decree was entered the Utah Code provided that alimony would 
automatically terminate upon the remarriage of the recipient former spouse or upon a showing 
that the recipient former spouse was residing with a person of the opposite sex. Utah Code 
Ann. § 30-3-5(5) & (6) (1991). In 1995 the Legislature amended the statute to provide tM 
u[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the 
EXHIBIT 3 
marriage existed unless, at any time prior to the termination of alimony, the court finds 
extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time." 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). 
The Defendant contends that subsection (7)(h) applies to this action and requires this 
Court to modify the Decree by permanently and irrevocably terminating the requirement that 
he pay alimony. He reasons that he was only married for nine years and two months (from 
August 1980 to October 1989), and yet he has paid alimony for ten years and two months 
(from August 1989 to October 1999), which is longer than the number of years that the 
marriage existed. He also argues that there were and are no extenuating circumstances 
justifying the payment of alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage, as 
now required by the statute. Therefore, he reasons that the requirement that he continue to 
pay alimony for a period longer than the duration of the marriage violates subsection (7)(h). 
The Plaintiff responds with the argument that subsection (7)(h) does not apply to this 
action because it cannot be retroactively applied. However, subsection (7)(h) clearly applies to 
this action. It is undisputed that "the substantive law to be applied throughout an action is the 
law in effect at the date the action was initiated." Wilde v. Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1998). For example, in Wilde, the defendant filed a petition in August 1994 seeking 
to modify the divorce decree to provide for additional alimony. IcL at 441. In January 1996 
the defendant filed an amended petition to modify. IcL Between the filing of the original and 
amended petitions, the 1995 amendments to § 30-3-5 took effect. IcL One effect of the 1995 
amendments was to add subsection (7)(g)(ii) conditioning a modification of alimony for the 
recipient spouse only upon a showing of extenuating circumstances. IcL This raised the issue 
of whether the court should apply the 1994 version or the amended 1995 version of § 30-3-5 to 
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the petition to modify. The Utah Court of Appeals held that because the action commenced 
with the filing of the original petition, and because subsection (7)(g)(ii) was a substantive 
change that could not be applied retroactively, the 1994 version of the statute applied to the 
petition to modify. IcL at 443. 
In the instant case there is no issue as to whether subsection (7)(h) applies retroactively 
because subsection (7)(h) was in effect at the time this action was filed. The instant action was 
initiated on July 21, 1999, when the Defendant filed his Petition for Modification. Because 
subsection (7)(h), enacted in 1995, was in effect at the date this action was initiated, it anplies 
to this action regardless of whether it constitutes a substantive change in the law. 
However, even though subsection (7)(h) applies to this action it is not dispositive of the 
issues raised in Defendant's Petition to Modify. The Defendant would have this Court 
interpret subsection (7)(h) to require that this Court must terminate any award of alimony 
entered prior to the 1995 amendment that extends beyond the number of years that the 
/ marriage existed, unless the recipient spouse can show the "extenuating circumstances" that the 
statute requires. The Court disagrees. Neither the language of the statute itself, nor the 
legislative intent behind the statute provide for such a result. 
The statute states, "[a]limony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number 
of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court 
finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of 
time." Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7)(h) (1998 & Supp. 1999). It is clear from the language of 
the statute itself that subsection (7)(h) merely limits the equitable powers of the courts in 
awarding alimony. It is not a command to courts to terminate previously entered alimony 
awards that extend beyond the duration of the marriage. The Legislature does not have the 
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power to require a court to reopen its prior orders, or to dictate the outcome of a case. Such a 
result would violate separation of powers principles. Utah Const. Art. V, § 1. Furthermore, 
the legislative intent, evident from the entire statutory scheme governing alimony, provides 
that an alimony award can only be terminated or modified upon a showing of a substantial 
material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce. Utah Code Ann. § 
30-3-5(7)(g)(i) (1998). The purpose of subsection (7)(h) was not to terminate previously 
entered alimony awards, but simply to limit the equitable powers of the courts when entering 
orders awarding alimony. Therefore., subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the 
Divorce Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award. 
Plaintiff contends that Defendant's Petition for Modification should be dismissed 
/ 
because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 
12(b)(6). In ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the Court must construe 
the complaint, or in this case the Petition, in a light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge 
all reasonable inferences in his favor. Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 823 P.2d 1055 
(Utah 1991), Defendant's only grounds for modification of the Divorce Decree is that this 
Court should terminate the alimony award under subsection (7)(h). For the reasons set forth 
above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce Decree and terminate 
Plaintiffs alimony award. Rather, this Court may only modify an alimony award upon a 
showing of "a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Because the Defendant has failed to allege any 
facts which would show a substantial material change in circumstances his Petition fails to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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The Defendant argues that if subsection (7)(h) does not require this Court to terminate 
the alimony award, then it violates the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment to the 
United States Constitution as well as Art. 1 Section 24 of the Utah Constitution which states 
that "[ajll laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation." The Defendant reasons that 
applying subsection (7)(h) in divorces brought after 1995, while ignoring the statute in pre-
1995 divorces brought before the Court on petitions to modify creates two classes of persons 
under the law: (1) those persons who must pay permanent alimony because they were divorced 
prior to the statute; and (2) those persons who only have to pay alimony for <he number of 
years the marriage existed, absent a showing of extenuating circumstances. However, the 
Court finds that subsection (7)(h) does not violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Uniform 
Operation of Law Clause because it does not create any type of classification. 
The protections contained in the Equal Protection and Uniform Operation of Law 
Clauses apply whenever the government acts to create distinct classes of individuals and treat 
them differently. Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 670 (Utah 1984). Subsection (7)(h) does 
not violate these principles however, because it does not create any type of classification, or 
treat one group any different than another. Rather, the statute simply changes the substantive 
law regarding alimony by limiting the equitable powers of the courts in awarding alimony for 
a period longer than the marriage existed. 
Furthermore, the Defendant is not now treated any differently under subsection (7)(h) 
than he was when his Decree was entered. The standard that the Defendant must meet in order 
to modify the amount he must pay in alimony is the same now as it was when his Decree was 
entered. In 1989 the standard for obtaining a modification of alimony required the movant to 
"show a substantial change of circumstances subsequent to the decree, that was not originally 
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contemplated within the decree itself." Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). This is precisely the same standard that the Defendant must meet today, as codified in 
Uan Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). Therefore, subsection (7)(h) does not create different 
classifications of individuals, or treat the Defendant any different than other similarly situated 
individuals who are ordered to pay alimony. The standard to modify alimony has always been 
the same, the only thing that has changed is that the Legislature has limited the equitable 
power of the courts in awarding alimony to extend beyond the number of years that the 
marriage existed. Accordingly, subsection (7)(h) is not unconstitutional unrlor either the 14,h 
Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article 1, Section 24 of the Constitution of the 
State of Utah. 
/ 
The Defendant also asserts that if subsection (7)(h) is not applied to terminate his 
obligation to pay alimony this may violate Article 1, Section 11 of the Utah Constitution (the 
"open courts" provision). However, he does not offer any analysis or explanation as to why 
the statute would violate this provision. The provision states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a party. 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 11. 
As discussed above, subsection (7)(h) does not allow this Court to modify the Divorce 
Decree and terminate Plaintiffs alimony award. Such a finding, however, does not bar 
Defendant from access to the courts or to a remedy. Rather, Defendant can petition this Court 
for a modification of his Divorce Decree upon a showing of "a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the divorce." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(7)(g)(i). 
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Therefore, subsection (7)(h) as applied in the instant case does not violate Article I Section 11 
of the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court hereby rules as follows: 
1. Defendant's Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce is DISMISSED. 
2. Counsel for Plaintiff shall prepare an order consistent with the terms of this 
ruling and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to form prior to submission to the 
Court fur signature, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. 
DATED this A ^ / d a y of-Qetober, 1999. 
X , , , 
/ R A Y M . HARDING, JR., JUDGE 
Ruling Page 7 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
T hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling with postage 
prepaid tnereon this / day of November, 1999, to the following: 
Stephen G. Homer 
Attorney at Law 
9225 South Redwood Road 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
Helen E. Christian 
GUSTIN, CHRISTIAN, SKORDAS & CASTON 
Suite 810 Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
/ 
4 Zy <-
Christopher D. Ballard 
Law Clerk 
